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we consider evidence of local benefit-dependency cultures. Well-known methodological 
problems in this type of analysis include avoiding the so-called reflection problem and 
disentangling the causal effects of group behavior on individual behavior from the effects 
of individual sorting on neighborhoods. Based on data from Sweden, we adopt several 
different approaches to deal with these problems. The results are robust in the sense that 
regardless of approach and identifying assumptions, we obtain statistically significant 
estimates indicating group effects. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The social insurance systems in advanced welfare states face serious moral-hazard 
problems. In some countries, these problems take the form of high levels of early 
retirement and disability pensions, such as in Belgium and the Netherlands. Other 
countries, like Norway and Sweden, have periodically experienced high and rapidly 
rising levels of sickness absenteeism – despite of indications of very good health 
conditions.
1 Sickness absenteeism has exhibited two conspicuous patterns: large 
aggregate cyclical fluctuations and huge variation across geographical areas within 
countries – even when the sick-pay insurance rules are the same throughout the country. 
 
It has turned out to be difficult to explain the observed patterns by standard variables, 
such as benefit rules, socioeconomic factors and general (measurable) health conditions. 
Some observers have therefore argued that these patterns could be related to social 
interaction, such as group effects on individual behavior.
2 In this paper we study the 
importance of group effects on moral hazard in sick-pay insurance (“temporary disability 
insurance”), which is a major element of social insurance in Europe. Although such 
effects may encompass several different mechanisms, our hypothesis is that peer-group 
influence in the form of social norms (i.e., approval or disapproval by others) is one 
important mechanism. 
 
We ask two questions. First, is there evidence that group influence exists in sickness 
absence behavior? Second, if such effects exist, how large might they be? These 
questions are important in the sense that group influence may accentuate the effects of 
exogenous changes, for instance in benefit rules, on sickness absence. Group influence 
thus may amplify the amount of moral hazard in insurance, an amplification that has been 
expressed by a so-called social multiplier in the theoretical literature.
3 
 
                                                 
1 Cf. Henrekson and Persson (2004) and Johansson and Palme (2005). 
2 For an attempt to document regional variations in attitudes concerning sickness absence, see Palmer 
(2006). 
3 See, e.g., Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (2003) and Lindbeck and Persson (2006).   2
While group effects have been extensively analyzed theoretically,
4 empirical analysis has 
been held back by methodological problems. These problems stem from the obvious 
difficulty in distinguishing group effects on individual behaviour from other mechanisms 
which generate correlation between individual and group behaviour. Different methods to 
overcome this problem have been used in the empirical literature. One such attempt is to 
exploit exogenous variation in factors influencing group behavior (Hesselius and 
Johansson, 2005, and Duflo and Saez, 2003). Another is to study the consequences for 
individual behavior of simultaneously belonging to two groups with different behavior 
patterns, by introducing fixed group effects into the regression (Bertrand et al., 2000). A 
third approach has been to examine the importance of proximity among individuals for 
the transmission of behavioral patterns, either within a structural modelling framework 
(e.g. Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman, 2003) or by applying a reduced form approach 
(e.g. Bokenblom and Ekblad, 2007). 
 
Using a data set that includes the entire Swedish population, we adopt four different 
approaches to analyze group effects on sickness absence behavior – with each approach 
requiring different identifying assumptions:  
 
1.  We exploit the difference in absence behavior between public- and private-sector 
employees to study whether the behavior of one of these groups of individuals 
influences the behavior of the other group. 
2.  We ask whether individuals who move from one neighborhood in Sweden to 
another tend to adjust their sick-absence behavior to normal behavior in the new 
neighborhood. 
3.  We study whether immigrants to Sweden adjust their behavior to that of native 
Swedes in the neighborhood where the immigrants have settled down. 
4.  We investigate the extent to which the behavior of an individual is influenced by 
the interaction of networks in his neighborhood and at his workplace.  
 
                                                 
4 Examples are Moffit (1983), Lindbeck, Nyberg and Weibull (1999), Manski (2000) and Lindbeck and 
Persson (2000).   3
Under all four approaches, we define group effects as the influence of average behavior 
in a neighborhood on individual behavior. The first approach addresses the existence and 
the magnitude of such influence separately. The second approach aim is aimed at 
estimating the magnitude, while the third approach is confined to finding evidence for the 
existence of group effects.  
 
As always, it is necessary to make rather specific identifying assumptions in this type of 
analysis, for instance concerning selection mechanisms. The advantage of using four 
different approaches (and alternative specifications within each) is that the study may 
then give an indication of the robustness of the results with respect to the underlying 
identifying assumptions.  
 
 
2.  A First Look at the Data 
 
Our data set combines individual sickness absence data from the Swedish National 
Insurance Agency with a large number of socioeconomic variables obtained from the 
LISA database, compiled by Statistics Sweden. In addition to providing information on 
numerous individual characteristics, the combined data set allows us to identify each 
individual’s neighborhood and workplace. The data consist of an unbalanced panel for 
the seven-year period 1996-2002. Although the data set covers the entire population in 
Sweden, we confine the study to private- and public-sector employees in the age group 
18-64 (almost 5 million individuals, which implies about 25 million observations in the 
entire panel). A limitation in the data set is that it only covers spells of absence longer 
than 14 days.
5 It would have been of interest to study shorter spells as well, but such data 
are not available on an individual basis.  
 
                                                 
5 The reason is that individual employers pay compensation for shorter spells, and that individual data on 
such spells are not systematically reported. The total average number of sick days for which sickness pay 
was claimed (including short spells) was about 25 per year during the period under study, as compared to 
17.8 in our data set containing only absence spells longer than 14 days.   4
When studying local social norms, a first issue is to determine the most relevant 
geographical domain. Municipalities may be too large for this purpose. We have 
therefore chosen to use so-called Small Area for Market Statistics unit (SAMS) for 
geographical domains in Sweden.
6 Such areas provide reasonably homogeneous districts 
based on geographical proximity among inhabitants and similarity in housing.
7 There are 
8,951 SAMS in our database, with an average population of 404 persons. In the 
following, we use the term “neighborhoods” for these areas. 
 
It may be argued that social interaction takes place at both local and national levels. For 
example, mass media and the public policy debate can be important channels for social 
interactions on the national level. Similarly, local media and local organizations can be 
important for interaction, for instance on the county levels. Here, however, we focus on 
direct interaction on the personal level. For this purpose the SAMS seems to be an 
appropriate geographical unit. 
 
We obtain a broad picture of local variations in sickness absence by looking at days of 
absence across neighborhoods during a year. For this purpose, we choose the last year for 
which we have data, namely 2002. Let  in S  denote the number of sick days of individual i 
living in neighborhood n in 2002, and  n S  the average number of sick days in that 
neighborhood. While the average number of sick days (above 14) in our data is 17.8, the 
standard deviation of  n S  is 13.2 days per year. How can this wide variation across 
neighborhoods be explained?  
 
First, to see whether the local variation simply reflects observable socioeconomic factors, 
we run a multivariate regression of the form 
 
'
in in in SX α β ε =+ +,     (1) 
 
                                                 
6 See Statistics Sweden (2005) for a detailed description of this geographical specification.  
7 It turns out that our empirical results are approximately the same regardless of whether we use 
municipalities, church parishes or the SAMS as the basic geographical unit.   5
where the X vector contains three types of socioeconomic variables: individual 
characteristics (such as age and education), characteristics of the individual’s workplace 
(such as industry and plant size), and neighborhood characteristics (such as urban/rural, 
local unemployment, and a local health variable). We have chosen explanatory variables 
that, in different studies, have turned out to be important for sickness absence. Due to the 
large number of observations, we can apply a flexible specification of the regression 
equation, using dummies rather than specific functional forms. A full list of the variables 
in the X vector is given in Appendix 1.
8  
 
As expected, the X vector explains very little of each individual’s behavior, since 
idiosyncratic factors tend to dominate individual behavior. More surprisingly, the X 
vector also explains very little of the variation of average sickness absence,  n S , across 
neighborhoods. While the standard deviation of average absence across neighborhoods in 
the 2002 raw data was 13.2 days, it is almost the same (12.9 days) after controlling for all 
the socioeconomic variables in the X vector. To find out whether the remaining 
differences among neighborhoods (the average residuals  n ε )  are systematic rather than 
random, we estimate an equation with neighborhood-specific intercepts  n α : 
 
'
in n in in SX α β ε =+ +.     (1') 
 
An F test suggests that (1') fits the data significantly better than the original specification 
(1) with a uniform intercept (F = 2.650, implying significance at the one-percent level
9). 
To rule out the possibility that this simply reflects permanent unobservable factors, we 
also estimate (1) and (1') in terms of changes in sickness absence. As in the case of levels, 
                                                 
8 We have not included income in the X vector. The reason is that reported income is affected by the 
individual’s sickness absence. Including income among the explanatory variables would have given rise to 
a bias in the estimates. Several of our explanatory variables are, however, correlated with income – for 
instance, age, education, gender, and industry.  
There are arguments for and against including local unemployment among the explanatory variables. In this 
paper, we have chosen to report the results from regressions where local unemployment is included – 
although excluding it would not change the results noticeably in terms of the influence of social norms on 
individual sickness absence.  
9 See, for instance, Greene (2003, chapter 13).   6
the average residuals of changes between 2001 and 2002 across neighborhoods vary 
systematically, i.e., in a non-random fashion (F = 1.370, again implying significance at 
the one-percent level). Thus, there is systematic local variation in average sickness 
absence not accounted for by the socioeconomic factors in our X vector. This holds not 
only for levels, but also for changes. Indeed, this result holds for the entire panel, and not 
only for specific years. 
 
 
3.  Measuring the Effect of Social Interactions 
 
The aim of our study is to investigate whether these large local variations reflect group 
effects on individual sickness absence behavior and, if so, how strong such effects are. 
We thus measure group behavior by the average number of sickness absence days in a 
neighborhood, by estimating the following relation: 
 
  in n in in S ' X S ε γ β α + + + = .     (2) 
 
As is well known, there are several methodological problems related to the estimation of 
group effects.
10 One serious problem is how to separate out the effect of group behavior 
through social interaction from the effect due to the fact that individuals with similar 
unobserved characteristics tend to live in the same neighborhood (correlated effects) or 
be exposed to similar local differences in policy (contextual effects). Indeed, running an 
OLS regression on (2) tends to give a biased estimate of γ  because of the so-called 
reflection problem (Manski, 2000): on average, an individual’s behavior is tautologically 
related to the average individual’s behavior. When we nevertheless run an OLS 
regression on (2), we obtain the estimate  8658 . 0 ˆ = γ , which is significant at the one-
percent level. 
 
                                                 
10 In all regression with average sickness  n S  as an explanatory variable, we exclude the individual’s own 
absence from the neighborhood average.   7
As described in the Introduction, we use four approaches for dealing with the reflection 
problem. One is based on exogenous variation in neighborhood sickness absence as the 
result of differences in absenteeism between employees in the public and private sector. 
The other approaches – the analysis of movers and immigrants, and of interactions 




4.  Public-sector vs. Private-sector Employees 
 
Public-sector employees in Sweden have systematically higher sickness absence than 
private-sector employees.
12 There may be several reasons behind this empirical 
regularity. The most obvious is that private employers have stronger incentives to prevent 
absence, since it is costly to the employer, whereas public employers have weaker direct 
incentives to minimize costs to their organization. It could also be the case that workers 
with preferences for frequent absence value the higher degree of employment security in 
the public sector and therefore self-select the public sector. 
 
This, in turn, means that neighborhoods with a large share of public-sector employees 
are, on average, likely to have a higher work absence rate. We exploit this fact and use 
the share of public-sector employees as an instrumental variable for the average work-
absence level in the neighborhood. We then carry out the analysis separately for private- 
and public-sector employees, respectively. The identifying assumption underlying this 
approach is that the share of public-sector employees in the neighborhood is unrelated to 
unobserved characteristics affecting individual work-absence behavior; formally, 
() 0 int = ε nt Z E , where nt Z  is the public sector’s share of employment in neighborhood n in 
year t.
13  Thus we assume that workers with specific absence behavior do not choose to 
                                                 
11 A model similar to that in equation (2) including individual fixed effects or differencing of the data 
would not solve the reflection problem, since the underlying factors (i.e., unobserved heterogeneity) may 
operate on changes as well as on levels. 
12 By sectors, the average number of days of sickness absence in our data set (spells longer than 14 days) in 
2001 were: private-sector employees 12.2; central government employees 15.4; municipal employees 20.3. 
13 More exactly, Z is the ratio of the number of public-sector employees to the sum of public- and private-
sector employees.   8
settle down in neighborhoods on the basis of the proportion between public- and private-
sector employees in these neighborhoods. In other words, we assume that the different 
behavior of these two groups of employees is related to the institutional characteristics of 
the sectors where they work, rather than to unobserved individual differences. 
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e cZ X k a S
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     (3) 
  
Conversely, we use  nt Z − 1  as an instrument to estimate the effects on individual public-
sector employees, 




) 1 ( '
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int nt int t
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nt nt t nt
S ' X S
e Z c b X k a S
ε γ β λ α + + + + =
+ − + + + =
     (3') 
  
We also estimate a system like (3) and (3') for the entire population, i.e., without 
superscript priv or publ on the S in the second equation.  
 
Before pursuing the IV analysis, it is of interest to investigate more directly whether the 
absence behavior of a private-sector employee is higher if he has many neighbors who 
work in the public sector, and vice versa. We therefore study the reduced form of the 
model defined in equations (3), i.e.,  
 
   int nt int t
priv




int S  is the sickness absence of individual i working in the private sector in year t. 
We expect the estimate of µ  to be positive.    9
 
Conversely, we ask whether a public-sector employee tends to be less absent from work 
if he lives in neighborhoods where there are many private-sector employees: 
 
  int nt int t
publ
int Z ' X S ε µ β λ α + − ⋅ + + + = ) 1 ( .  (4') 
 
The results of the estimates are shown in the fourth column of Table 1. As expected, a 
higher share of public-sector employees in a neighborhood is associated with higher 
sickness absence among private-sector employees in that neighborhood. The number 
0.0387 means that if the share of public-sector employees is 10 percentage points higher 
in one neighborhood than in another, then sickness absence among the privately 
employed is approximately 0.387 days higher in the first neighborhood. Similarly, if the 
share of private employees in one neighborhood is 10 percentage points higher in than in 
another, the number of sick days among public-sector employees is 0.438 days lower.  
 
For completeness, we have also made reduced-form estimates based on the entire 
population (private- as well as public-sector employees). The number 0.0418 means that 
if the share of public employees in a neighborhood is 10 percentage points higher than in 
another, the average number of absence days among all employees is 0.418 days higher. 
 
Note that the estimation of µ  does not provide a quantification of the influence of 
average behavior on the individuals; it is simply an indicator of the existence of social 
interaction across the groups of private-sector and public-sector employees. Moreover, 
this indicator reflects only social interaction across the groups, not social interaction 
within groups. To obtain a quantification of total group influence on individual behavior, 
an estimate of  γ  in the full IV model is required. The resulting estimates are shown in 
the fifth and sixth columns of Table 1. 
   10
 
 
Table 1: Estimates of  µ  in (4) and (4'), and of  γ  in (3) and (3') 
 




form (µ  in 
eq. (4) ) 
First step in 
IV 
regression 
(c in eq. (3)) 
IV estimate 
(γ in eq. (3)) 
All those who 
work in private 
sector 
 
  2,839,410 ind. 
14,556,753 obs. 
Share of population 
in neighborhood n  
that work in public 















All those who 
work in public 
sector  
 
  1,956,740 ind. 
10,502,405 obs. 
 
Share of population 
in neighborhood n  
that work in private 














2 = R  
All employees    4,796,150 ind. 
25,059,158 obs. 
Share of population 
in neighborhood n  
that work in public 
















*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
   11
Estimating equation (3), we first see from the first-step estimates in column six that Z is a 
very good instrument for the average absence in a neighborhood; the standard deviations 
are minuscule relative to the coefficients. In the second step, for the case where the 
behavior of private-sector employees is the dependent variable, we obtain γ  = 0.581. 
According to this estimate, a typical private-sector individual has 0.581 more sick days if 
he lives in a neighborhood where the average number of sick days is one day higher than 
in another neighborhood. Similarly, a typical public-sector employee would have 0.762 
more sick days. For the entire population (private plus public sectors), a person who lives 
in a neighborhood with an average that is one day higher than in another neighborhood 
would have 0.672 more sick days.  
 
These estimates, standing alone, should be interpreted with caution. A possible reason for 
validity problems of the instrument is that private-sector workers with a preference for 
being absent are particularly likely to settle down in neighborhoods with a comparatively 




5.  Movers within Sweden 
 
So far, we have dealt with the reflection problem under the identifying assumption that 
private-sector individuals with preferences for absence do not self-select to 
neighborhoods with many public-sector employees – and a corresponding assumption for 
public-sector employees. In this section, we use two different identifying assumptions. In 
this section we consider individuals who have changed neighborhood within Sweden, and 
investigate whether they adjust their absence behavior to average behavior in the new 
neighborhood. Here, we can control for fixed individual heterogeneity since we have data 
on each individual’s behavior in the previous neighborhood. In the next section, we look 
at immigrants from abroad (in fact, mainly refugees). The self-selection problem is then 
mitigated since these individuals have to a considerable extent been allocated to 
neighborhoods by the authorities.   12
 
In the case of movers within Sweden, we limit the study to the individual’s absence 
behavior during the first year in the new neighborhood (as compared to his previous 
behavior in the old neighborhood). Thus, we look only at very short-term adjustments.
14 
Denoting the old neighborhood by n and the new by m, we estimate the following model: 
 












− − − ) ( ) ' ' ( 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , .    (5) 
 
We use this analytical specification to investigate whether people who move from 
neighborhood n to neighborhood m adjust their behavior in response to the difference in 
average absence between these two neighborhoods. The coefficient η  captures this 
influence. The reflection problem is avoided since there are two different population 
groups on the left-hand and right-hand sides of the equation; we can therefore estimate 
(5) by OLS. Moreover, with changes rather than levels on the left-hand side, thereby 
controlling for type, the selection problem is alleviated. The identifying assumption is 
that people who plan to change their absence behavior in the future do not tend to move 
to neighbourhoods with a particular level of average sickness absence. 
  
The specification in (5) assumes that the adjustment is symmetric when moving between 
neighborhoods with different absence rates. In reality, individuals may be influenced 
differently when moving to neighborhoods with higher absence rates than when moving 
to neighborhoods with lower rates. We allow for this possibility in specification (5'): 
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14 Long-term adjustment could in principle also be studied using panel data. However, some analytical 
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The results are reported in Table 2. Since η ˆ of equation (5) is highly significant, we 
conclude that individuals to some extent adjust their behavior to average behavior in the 
new neighborhood, even in a very short time perspective. If someone moves to a 
neighborhood with one day’s lower average absence, his absence falls by around 0.03 
days. However, since δ ˆ of equation (5') is not significant, there does not seem to be any 
asymmetry when moving to areas with lower sickness absence as compared to areas with 





    Table 2: Movers within Sweden 
 
  No. of  individuals 
and observations 
2 R   η ˆ  δ ˆ  
Symmetric 
specification  (5)  
1,551,059 ind. 
2,202,466 obs. 




specification (5')  
1,551,059 ind. 
2,202,466 obs. 






Clearly, it does not seem likely that individuals make full adjustment to the average 
behavior in a new neighbourhood within a year. We therefore regard the results of Table 
2 as an indication of social interaction, rather than a full quantification of such 
interaction. In this sense, the number 0.032 may be regarded as a lower bound on group 
influence. 
   14
 
6.  Immigrants 
 
We use the following model to investigate whether immigrants are affected by the work-












int S  is the number of sick days of immigrant i in neighborhood n, while 
s
nt S  is the 
average number of sick days among native Swedes in that neighborhood. Since the 
absence variable on the left-hand side refers to a different group of people than the 
absence variable on the right-hand side, there is no reflection problem in this case either. 
We are thus able to rely on OLS, and we apply the identifying assumption that there is no 
tendency among immigrants with a high propensity for sickness absence to settle down in 
neighborhoods where the absence rates among natives are particularly high (“reverse 
causation”).  
 
Since we have data on each individual’s country of origin, we can investigate whether 
immigrants with a cultural background similar to that of Swedes tend to adjust more than 
other immigrants to local Swedish absence behavior. The implied hypothesis is that such 
immigrants are likely to interact more than other immigrant groups with Swedes. 
 
Since we want to study the transmission to immigrants of norms held by natives, it is 
natural to exclude neighborhoods where immigrants form a majority of the population. 
Indeed, we confine the regression to neighborhoods where the fraction of immigrants is 
less than 20 percent of the total population. The results are shown in Table 3. 
According to these highly significant estimates, sickness absence among immigrants is 
0.629 days higher in a neighborhood where average absence among Swedes is one day 
higher than in another neighborhood. We interpret this figure as a proper estimate of the   15
coefficient γ  in equation (2). It is noteworthy that the order of magnitude of this estimate 
is about the same as in the IV estimate reported in Table 2. 
 
The coefficients are particularly large for immigrants from other Nordic and EU countries 
(0.651 and 0.461 days, respectively). Our interpretation is that cultural affinity between 
immigrants and natives makes it easier to build networks in the new country. This result 
supports our hypothesis that social interaction helps explain individual sickness absence, 
since such interaction often takes place within networks. The effects are stronger, the 
tighter is the network. 
 
Could the results reported in Table 3 depend on selection rather than on social 
interaction, thereby violating our basic identifying assumption? We could think of (at 
least) two types of such selection. One would be that the authorities (perhaps 
unintentionally) allocate immigrants with a high propensity to be absent from work to 
neighborhoods where the absence rates are particularly high among Swedes. This 
mechanism seems quite far-fetched, however. Self-selection by the immigrants 
themselves may be a more serious problem. We cannot fully rule out the possibility of 
some indirect mechanism by   16
 






Region Number  of  ind. 
and obs. 
Estimate of γ  













     77,982 ind. 





   154,378 ind. 
   744,440 obs. 
 0.126*** 
(0.0176) 
Africa       38,422 ind. 





     21,655 ind. 





     36,556 ind. 
   167,644 obs. 
 0.345*** 
(0.0347) 
Asia     173,447 ind. 
   723,644 obs. 
 0.237*** 
(0.0157) 
Oceania         3,626 ind. 





       4,398 ind. 
     22,566 obs. 
 0.037 
(0.0949)   17
which immigrants with a strong propensity to call in sick by self-selection would wind up 
in areas with many Swedes having the same propensity. For instance, immigrants with 
high labor-market ambitions may exhibit a particularly strong tendency to avoid areas 
with a weak labor market (to the extent that they are able to move at all). As a result, less 
ambitious immigrants might remain in areas where Swedes also have modest labor-
market ambitions. If labor-market ambitions are negatively correlated with the propensity 
to call in sick, and if these ambitions are not reflected in the X vector, such a correlation 
may create a selection bias in the regression. Taking this possibility seriously, we have 
run regressions confined to recent immigrants (individuals who have lived in Sweden for 
one, two or three years, respectively). The results of these regressions are shown in 
Appendix 2; they imply that the longer an individual has been in Sweden, the higher is 
the coefficients γ. There are at least two possible interpretations of this finding. One is 
that it takes time for immigrants to observe and adjust to the behavior of native Swedes in 
the new location, and hence to build up and be influenced by networks with natives. 
Another interpretation is that the longer an immigrant has been in Sweden, the more 
likely is self-selection bias.  
 
In summary, there are indications that social interaction between natives and immigrants 
matters for the sickness absence behavior of the latter. These indications are strengthened 
by the observation that the quantitative effects differ depending on the cultural 
background of the immigrants, and hence on the strength of their networks with natives.  
 
 
7.  Interaction between Neighborhood and Workplace Networks 
 
If two individuals meet not only in their neighborhood, but also at their workplace, the 
strength of their social interaction may be accentuated; individuals would “rub shoulders” 
not only during their leisure time, but also during their working time. More generally, it is 
reasonable to assume that social norms and attitudes are transmitted more easily when 
individuals have more than one network in common. This form of interaction between   18
two different networks can be used when estimating the effect of social interaction on 
work absence. For this purpose, we use the following model:  
 
inwt inwt n w t nt inwt inwt iwnt CA S CA X S ε ϕ µ κ λ ν β α + + + + + ⋅ ⋅ + + = ) ( ' ,      (7) 
 
where the subscript w denotes the workplace.  inwt CA  is a measure of the additional 
strength of the network facing individual inw at time t when he belongs to two different 
networks. It is defined as the fraction of the individual’s neighbors who are also his 




Thus, the estimate of ν  in equation (7) tells us whether there is an additional network 
effect for individuals who are not only neighbors but also coworkers. The coefficient ν , 
therefore, represents only a small fraction (an accentuation) of total social interaction. 
Note that the specification in (7) implies that the fixed neighborhood effect,  n µ , and the 
fixed workplace effect,  w κ , control for omitted variables in the X vector.  In addition to 
the fixed effects and the interaction term  nt inwt S CA ⋅ , equation (7) includes the density 
(concentration) measure   inwt CA  separately. This allows us to control also for the 
possibility that the strength of the network in itself may be correlated with unobservable 
characteristics systematically related to the propensity to be absent from work. Our 
identifying assumption then is that there is no correlation between the interaction term 
nt inwt S CA ⋅  and any remaining non-observable variables that affect sickness absence, i.e., 
() () t w n inwt nt inwt t w n inwt nt nt inwr inwt X S E X S S CA E λ κ µ ε λ κ µ ε , , , | , , , , | = ⋅ .  
 
 
                                                 
15 Equation (7) has basically the same analytical structure as the one used by Bertrand et al. (2000) when 
studying the interaction between language groups and neighborhoods in an analysis of the reliance on 
social assistance (“welfare” in U.S. terminology) among ethnic minorities in the United States.   19
Note here that the vector  i X  in (7) is a subset of the previously used X vector. The reason 
is that the neighborhood and workplace variables in X become redundant because the 
neighborhood and workplace fixed effects are included separately in the regression 
equation. The network-intensity variable only varies on the neighborhood/workplace 
level; we therefore adjust the standard errors for clustering within these cells (see e.g. 
Moulton, 1986).  
 
When computing the ratio  inwt CA , we include in the denominator not only employees in 
the private and the public sector, but also employees in a third, ”unspecified” sector,
16 
and self-employed persons. The reason is that  inwt CA  is supposed to measure the 
probability of meeting a coworker in one’s neighbourhood.
17  
  
Table 4 shows the results from the OLS estimation. The ν ˆ is significantly different from 
zero. This means that we find evidence of social interaction on the utilization of the sick-
pay insurance program. The size of the coefficient does not have a straightforward 
interpretation. But it is possible to calculate the marginal effect with respect to changes in 
average utilization of sick-pay insurance in the neighborhood, i.e.,  n iwn S S ∂ ∂ / , which is 
easily seen to be equal to  inwt CA ⋅ ν . This parameter tells us how an increase in the average 
absence  nt S  in a neighborhood influences individual absence through the interplay 
between neighborhood and workplace networks.  
 
Table 4 shows that if the average absence in an average Swedish neighborhood increases 
by ten days, the strength-of-network effect adds 0.502 days to the average individual’s 
absence. Following the discussion above, it should be stressed that this marginal effect is 
not comparable to our previous estimate of the  γ  coefficient in equation (2), which 
captures the full effect of a change in the average absence rate in the neighborhood.
18 
                                                 
16 This sector is rather heterogeneous and consists of persons with very weak ties to the labor market, i.e., 
they sometimes work temporarily in the private and/or public sector. 
17 The estimates do not change self-employed persons in the neighborhood are also included in the 
denominator. 
18 In the context of equation (7), social interaction is also reflected in the fixed effects  n µ  and  w κ .   20
 
 
Table 4: The strength-of-network effect 
 










2 R  
24,449,603 obs. 





Note: The numbers of observations and individuals in this table are somewhat smaller than the 
corresponding numbers in Table 1. The reason is that for each individual, we have deleted the 
individual himself from the data when computing the averages  n S . For some neighborhoods, 





8.  Concluding Remarks 
 
We have used four different strategies for estimating the effects of social interaction 
within neighborhoods on absence behavior. All of these strategies unambiguously 
indicate that such interaction effects do in fact exist. However, all four strategies do not 
ask exactly the same question. In some cases we try to estimate the size of group effects 
on individual behavior (the parameter γ in equation 2), while in other cases we merely 
attempt to find indications of interaction effects. Moreover, we apply different 
identifying assumptions under the four strategies; this partly explains why the estimates 
differ. These approaches may be summarized as follows:  
 
1.  The private- vs. public-sector models in Section 4 rely on the identifying 
assumption that individuals with specific absence propensities do not self-select 
into neighborhoods on the basis of the share of public-sector versus private-sector 
employees in these neighborhoods. 
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2.  The analysis of movers within Sweden in Section 5 relies on the assumption that 
individuals who expect to change their absence behavior do not choose to move 
to neighborhoods with particular average absence rates.  
 
3.  Our analysis of absence behavior among immigrants in Section 6 relies on the 
assumption that immigrants with particular propensities for absence do not settle 
down (as a result of administrative discretion or by self-selection) in 
neighborhoods where native Swedes have similar propensities.  
 
4.  The model exploiting interaction between neighborhood networks and workplace 
networks in Section 7 relies on the assumption that there is no correlation between 
neglected unobservable variables and the term for the network interaction. 
 
It is noteworthy that the two attempts to quantify group effects (the IV model in Section 4 
and the immigrant model in Section 5.2) yield rather similar results; the point estimates 
of the group effect, γ , are 0.672 and 0.629, respectively. If our identifying assumptions 
under these approaches (points 1 and 3 above) are not satisfied, the estimates would be 
biased upwards. It is also worth noting that the estimates of the group effect, γ, turn out to 
be higher in the case of immigrants from countries that are culturally close to Sweden 
(such as the other Nordic countries).  This by itself could be interpreted as support for the 
presence of social interaction at the neighborhood level, irrespective of the validity of the 
identifying assumption.  
 
The identifying assumptions under strategies 2 (movers within Sweden) and 4 
(interaction between networks) may be less demanding. The results from these two 
approaches may therefore be more robust. Here, however, we do not obtain any estimate 
of γ, but only an indication of social interaction. The point estimate from the analysis of 
movers, according to which one additional day of average absence in the neighborhood 
leads to an increase of 0.032 days the year after a move, should be interpreted as a lower 
bound. After all, it is likely to take more than one year after a move for the full effect to 
show up. The estimated effect of the interaction between neighborhood and workplace   22
networks, 0.0502, may be regarded as another estimate of the lower bound, since it does 
not capture group effects within these networks.  
 
In this paper we have only dealt with a few types of group effects, i.e., personal contacts 
within neighborhoods (and the possible accentuation of such contacts through 
workplaces). There are, of course, other important channels for group effects. One 
example is personal interaction outside the neighborhood, for instance with relatives, 
those in the same profession, or those with similar interests. Another channel for group 
effects is through local and national mass media. Disregarding all these channels is, in 
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  Appendix 1: Explanatory variables in the X vector 
For the individual  Age (all ages from 18 to 64, one dummy for each 
age, i.e., 46 dummies) 
 
  Education (seven levels, one dummy for each level, 
i.e., six dummies) 
 
  Gender (one dummy) 
 
  Marital status (single, married/cohabitating, 
divorced; two dummies)  
 
  Has children aged 3 or younger (one dummy) 
 
  Region of origin (Sweden, Northern Europe, rest of 
Europe, etc.; 10 dummies) 
For the workplace  Industry (60 industries, i. e., 59 dummies) 
 
  Sector (central government, state-owned enterprise, 
local government, local government-owned 
enterprise, private firm, etc.; 11 sectors, i.e., 10 
dummies)* 
 
  Size of workplace (21 dummies: 1 employee, 2-10, 
11-20, 21-30, …, 91-100, 101-200, 201-300, …, 
901-1000, 1001-9999 employees) 
For the neighborhood  Urban or rural (one dummy) 
 
  Life expectancy in the municipality (average, 
gender-specific life expectancy among the 291 
municipalities in Sweden) 
 
  Local unemployment (expressed as the incidence of 
unemployment, i.e., the fraction of the labor force 
in the neighborhood that has received 
unemployment compensation at least once during 
the year. 19 dummy variables, one for each 5-
percent interval) 
 
             * The distinction between industry and sector is that the former refers to the type  
                of product or service produced, while the latter refers to ownership characteristics. 
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Appendix 2: Estimates for immigrants from abroad, according to length of stay in Sweden. 
*** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5, and * at the 10 percent leve






Region Number  of 
observations
Estimate 












of γ  
All regions  3,376,753   0.629*** 
(0.0063) 
239,314   0.055*** 
(0.0070) 
214,932   0.037*** 
(0.0053) 




1,088,923   0.651*** 
(0.0174) 
  45,238   0.074*** 
(0.0245) 
  41,952   0.045 
(0.0191) 





   358,797   0.461*** 
(0.0242) 
  36,408   0.063*** 
(0.0198) 
  32,452   0.053*** 
(0.0180) 




   744,440   0.126*** 
(0.0176) 
  45,831   0.028 
(0.0183) 
  41,013   0.009 
(0.0143) 
  26,336  -0.005 
(0.0091) 
Africa     163,554   0.091*** 
(0.0308) 
  13,980  -0.023 
(0.0324) 
  12,505  -0.010 
(0.0223) 
    8,117  -0.006 
(0.0178) 
North America       92,321   0.278*** 
(0.0360) 
  12,269   0.060*** 
(0.0382) 
  11,123   0.035 
(0.0272) 
    7,124   0.024* 
(0.0136) 
Latin America     167,644   0.345*** 
(0.0347) 
    9,380   0.121** 
(0.0433) 
    8,376   0.130** 
(0.0525) 
    5,400   0.034 
(0.0387) 
Asia     723,644   0.237*** 
(0.0157) 
  72,525   0.020** 
(0.0099) 
  64,208   0.012 
(0.0082) 
  40,865   0.005 
(0.0030) 
Oceania       14,146   0.222*** 
(0.0766) 
    3,017   0.125 
(0.0895) 
    2,711   0.077 
(0.0671) 




   22,566   0.037 
(0.0949) 
      399  -0.223 
(0.4034) 
       361   0.189 
(0.1535) 
       239  -0.022 
(0.0333) 
N/A          718   0.266 
(0.3090) 
      267   0.163 
(0.2113) 
       231  -0.005 
(0.0045) 
       136  N/A 
 